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Besides the more conventional top-down leverage and bottom-up linkage approach the EU 
uses a third way to promote democracy in third countries: promotion of democratic 
governance through functional cooperation in policy sectors. This governance model of 
democracy promotion has so far been studied only with regard to its effectiveness in target 
countries. In contrast to earlier research, this paper takes an „input‟ perspective and asks 
whether adverse sectoral economic interests prevent the EU from consistent democratic 
governance promotion. Based on three case studies from the two policy sectors of 
environmental and fisheries policy, the paper concludes that EU democratic governance 
promotion is indeed inconsistent when sectoral economic interests are at stake. The 
governance model is thus subject to the same pattern of inconsistency as the leverage and 
linkage model with regard to economic interests. 
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Introduction 
 
The last years have not only seen the emergence of extensive European Union (EU) external 
governance
1
 but also of an EU democracy promotion strategy that is directly connected to it. 
This strategy aims at deliberately making use of the functional ties established under the 
external governance agenda with third countries by transferring norms of democratic 
governance through sectoral cooperation. It was first outlined as one instrument among others 
in the 2001 European Commission‟s Communication on human rights and democracy 
promotion. There, the Commission acknowledged the potential of a sectoral approach to 
democracy promotion: 
 
To promote human rights and democratisation objectives in external relations, the EU draws on a 
wide-range of instruments […] Some are more innovative, and potentially underused, namely 
Community instruments in policy areas such [as] the environment, trade, the information society 
and immigration which have the scope to include human rights and democratisation objectives. 
These tools should be used in a coherent manner, to achieve synergy and consistency and to ensure 
maximum effective use of resources to promote sustainable development and respect for human 
rights and democratisation world-wide.
2
 
 
The Commission‟s approach was subsequently supported by the Council.3 
Shortly after the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which can be 
regarded as the EU‟s most ambitious external governance project, the Commission stated that 
one of the goals regarding the participating countries is „introducing sectoral reforms [...] in 
order to improve management and encourage the authorities to account for their decisions to 
those they administer‟.4 Thus, the aim is not only to make sectoral governance in third 
neighbouring countries more effective, as standards of good governance would emphasize.
5
 
By stressing the notion of accountability these reforms are also intended to make sectoral 
governance more democratic through the enhancement of popular control.
6
 As the Council 
and the Commission jointly pointed out, in the ENP Action Plans „democracy building and 
support‟ do not only feature in the „political section‟ but are also components of the other, i.e. 
the sectoral sections.
7
 There they are part of solutions for sectoral policy problems. 
The goal of democratic governance promotion through functional cooperation is not 
restricted to the ENP. With regard to developing countries, the Commission outlined a similar 
approach by stressing the importance of mainstreaming democratic governance objectives 
into sectoral cooperation:  
 
Democratic governance is to be approached holistically, taking account of all its dimensions 
(political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, etc.). […] Accordingly, the concept of 
democratic governance has to be integrated into each and every sectoral programme.
8 
 
Again, democratic governance is acknowledged as a goal of cooperation. The intention is that 
it should form part of the sectoral cooperation that is in the first place directed at objectives 
such as reaching the Millennium Development Goals. Thus, the basic idea in both the ENP as 
well as in the approach towards developing countries is to „use‟ sectoral functional 
cooperation, however motivated in the first place, in order to seek to develop norms of 
democratic governance to third countries. 
In order analytically to grasp this new approach – which complements the more 
traditional bottom-up and top-down external democratization strategies – the governance 
model of democracy promotion has been introduced in the literature.
9
 Democratic governance 
promotion represents a more horizontal approach based on functional, transgovernmental 
cooperation in policy sectors. Through such cooperation, the sector specific rules of 
democratic governance embodied in the EU‟s acquis communautaire are promoted in the 
third country as parts of solutions for policy problems. The target actors are neither the third 
countries‟ governments nor civil society but sub-units of state administration. In contrast but 
not in opposition to democracy proper, which relates to the level of the polity and is often 
connected to certain institutional features such as general elections, the notion of democratic 
governance is defined at a sectoral level and comprises the three main principles of 
transparency, accountability, and participation.
10
 So far, it has been shown that the EU is 
fairly successful in promoting the formal adoption of rules of democratic governance in third 
countries.
11
 However, it has not been asked under what conditions the EU engages in 
democratic governance promotion in the first place. In particular, we do not know yet whether 
EU democratic governance promotion follows the same pattern of inconsistency that can be 
found in the top-down
12
 and bottom-up approaches
13
 to democracy promotion. 
This article responds to the call for more empirical analysis of the EU‟s commitment 
to normative foreign policy goals in specific policy sectors.
14
 In particular, it will be examined 
whether adverse sectoral economic interests have an influence on the promotion of public 
participation as one element of democratic governance. In order to answer the question, the 
consistency of EU promotion of public participation in third countries will be analysed in 
three cases from the EU‟s external environmental and fisheries policy that are characterized 
by varying degrees of adverse sectoral economic interests. The article follows participatory 
democratic theories that stress the democratizing potential of public participation 
procedures.
15
 Participatory governance will here be generally understood as interaction of the 
public with institutions of the political system in the process of making binding decisions with 
the aim of influencing these decisions.
16
 While public participation is not necessarily 
successful it must be meaningful, i.e. participatory governance does not include instances of 
„ceremonial‟ or „pseudo‟ participation.17  
The article proceeds in the following way. The next part deals with the explanations 
that have been offered in the literature in order to account for the EU‟s inconsistent 
democracy promotion through the intergovernmental and transnational channels. This 
provides the basis for case selection. In the subsequent empirical part, the three case studies – 
cooperation on genetically modified organisms (GMO) and water governance with the 
Eastern European ENP countries
18
 and cooperation on fisheries policy under Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements (FPA) – will be presented and the EU‟s democratic governance 
promotion activities will be analysed. The article finishes with the conclusion that EU 
democratic governance promotion is inconsistent when important sectoral interests are 
concerned.  
 
Consistency of EU democracy promotion 
 
In a review of the existing literature regarding the consistency of EU general democracy 
promotion, Frank Schimmelfennig comes to the conclusion that „[d]espite the pervasive 
political and legal rhetoric of democracy and human rights promotion, actual policy seems to 
match rhetoric only when consistency is “cheap”; otherwise, it is driven by a host of other – 
geopolitical, economic or security – interests‟.19 More particularly, authors have demonstrated 
that in cases where (soft) security issues arise the EU foregoes democracy promotion.
20
 It is 
also suggested that „conflicting functional goals‟ may have led to a less consistent application 
of (positive) conditionality.
21
 Furthermore, it was shown that inconsistency in the EU‟s 
reaction to third states‟ non-compliance with democratic standards is mainly due to self-
regarding concerns.
22
 With regard to democracy promotion through linkage it has been 
pointed out that the rather unsuccessful implementation of the bottom-up approach in the 
Southern Mediterranean countries can in part be attributed to EU Member States‟ (in 
particular, French and Spanish) „political objections to a strengthening of the EU‟s 
democratization policy in the Mediterranean‟.23  
Existing studies on EU external democracy promotion provide different explanations 
for the observed inconsistencies. The most pervasive argument is that economic and security 
interests override democratization objectives.
24
 Another, related explanation is 
interdependence, which, if asymmetrical in favour of the third country, is assumed to lead to a 
decrease in democracy promotion.
25
 Taking into account that democratization may lead to 
instability and war
26, the EU‟s reluctant democracy promotion has also been explained with 
the democracy-stability dilemma.
27
  
EU democracy promotion has also been found to be dependent on target countries‟ 
geographic proximity. Starting from a democratic peace proposition and the EU‟s strategy to 
gain regional influence through integration it has been argued that „the EU possesses a 
weighted utility function where its benefits from democracy in a neighbouring country are 
weighted more heavily than anywhere else‟.28 The same tendency can be expected from a 
constructivist angle. Identity-based values and norms are supposed to „become the more 
politically relevant in relations with external countries the closer these countries move toward 
membership‟.29 Finally, the ambiguity of the template for democracy promotion has been 
named as a reason for inconsistent application of standards.
30
 
Which expectations can we derive from the existing literature for democratic 
governance promotion? Given the strong emphasis that the literature puts on overriding 
interests, we can assume that „only if no other concerns [...] are important in a given 
situation‟31 will the EU promote democratic governance. Which concerns should be 
considered as being „important‟? This paper employs a liberal view on democratic governance 
promotion in that it takes a „“bottom-up” view of politics‟.32 It thus follows recent empirical 
studies that have provided evidence for the influence of domestic sectoral interests on the 
EU‟s external relations in the fields of environment, development and trade.33 Since 
democratic governance promotion proceeds at a sectoral level, it can be expected that 
countervailing influential sectoral economic interests are an obstacle to it and that the EU‟s 
external relations „in a given issue area will aim at achieving the material or immaterial goals 
which are pursued by the most influential domestic actors‟.34 Thus, it can be hypothesized that 
the more salient domestic interests are connected to the external dimension of the policy 
sector that would be hurt by the promotion of democratic governance the more likely it is that 
the EU forgoes this goal.  
In this article, I will examine whether the presence of adverse sectoral economic 
interests has an influence on democratic governance promotion. In order to do so, a most 
similar case design will be combined with comparison of a case of the same type. Whereas the 
controlled comparison reveals the outcome of the key independent variable on the dependent 
variable, the latter may reveal whether causal paths are similar and increase confidence in 
generalization.
35
 The EU‟s policy will first be analysed in the environmental sector with 
regard to cooperation with Eastern European ENP countries on GMO and water issues. 
Environmental cooperation with Eastern European countries has been chosen because it 
allows keeping other explanatory variables stable for cases with different values on the key 
independent variable. Furthermore, according to the above mentioned explanations the 
context is rather favourable for democratic governance promotion. First, the environmental 
sector has a comparatively well developed acquis on participatory governance. There are even 
issue specific templates that the EU could promote in third countries. Thus ambiguity of 
standards is low. The templates are also embedded in international law and their promotion 
can thus be seen as legitimate.
36
 Furthermore, there is a „misfit‟ in so far that the Eastern 
European ENP countries have not yet established comprehensive participatory arrangements 
in environmental decision making. Interdependence with regard to the two policy sectors and 
overall interdependence is not to the detriment of the EU. Environmental policy can generally 
be regarded as „low politics‟, which excludes security interests as sources of inconsistency. 
Finally, although they are not on the way to accession, the Eastern European ENP countries 
are geographically close to the EU. Furthermore, they are part of an „expanding system of 
functional regional integration‟.37 Thus, overall, the conditions for democratic governance 
promotion are very favourable. However, with the field of GMO the sector contains an issue 
that is highly disputed and where economic interests are at stake. As will be shown in more 
detail below, some economic interests are not particularly compatible with democratic 
governance promotion. Since there are no comparably strong economic interests with respect 
to water governance the cases vary with regard to the key independent variable.
38
 
The third case in the comparison – cooperation on fisheries policy under the FPAs – is 
similar to the GMO case. Since the cooperation on sectoral policy reform in third countries is 
part of a commercial arrangement there is a tension between commercial goals such as access 
to the resource and the promotion of governance objectives in order to enhance sustainability. 
At the same time, this case can also be regarded as low politics. Interdependence is not 
disadvantageous for the EU. There are EU internal and international templates on 
participatory governance in the fisheries sector.
39
 Geographically, however, the case is more 
diverse since it covers countries belonging to the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States, and also the ENP country Morocco. 
 
EU promotion of participatory governance 
 
Environmental Policy 
 
 The issue of public participation entered European environmental policy in the early 1990s. 
Today, the EU acquis on participative governance is well developed. This is true for general 
provisions such as the ones on Environmental Impact Assessment
40
, but there are also sector 
specific rules as will be outlined below. The EU‟s environmental policy has developed a very 
ambitious and multifaceted external dimension. One priority of the EU is the promotion of 
environmental cooperation with neighbouring countries and regions.
41
 With the Eastern 
European ENP countries, cooperation takes place in different frameworks, among others 
under the ENP sub-committees, but also in international fora such as the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). One of the overall aims of environmental 
cooperation with Eastern Europe is the improvement of environmental governance, which 
includes public participation in environmental decision-making. 
 
Genetically Modified Organisms 
 
Compulsory rules for public participation with regard to the deliberate release of GMO can be 
found in Article 9 of Directive 2001/18 that entered into force on 17 April 2002 and repealed 
an earlier Directive with non-binding rules on public participation. Similarly, the Regulation 
1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed includes provisions on access to 
information and in Arts. 6(7) and 18(7) gives the public an opportunity to make comments on 
the opinion of the Authority that deals with an application for authorization. 
While codifying participation rules in GMO matters internally, the EU is rather 
reluctant to promote them in Eastern European ENP countries. Although the Sixth 
Environmental Action Programme mentioned „supporting the build up of regulatory 
frameworks in third countries where needed through technical and financial assistance‟ as a 
priority action regarding GMO
42
 the EU is not very active on this issue with regard to this 
particular region. Despite the fact that legislation on GMO and biosafety was still 
underdeveloped in the Eastern European ENP countries in the early and mid-2000s, 
cooperation on this issue was – in contrast to issues such as water quality, waste management 
and air pollution – not foreseen in the ENP strategy paper43 and is not mentioned in any of the 
ENP Action Plans with Eastern neighbours.
44
  
Cooperation on participation regarding GMO issues is not only neglected but the EU 
has even deliberately obstructed attempts to promote participation rules related to GMOs in 
the Eastern European ENP countries. In the early 2000s, several countries in transition 
explicitly demanded an internationally binding template for participation rights in GMO 
matters in order to introduce respective rules „at home‟. For that reason, they suggested to 
amend the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) which hitherto contained 
only a very weak provision on public participation regarding GMO issues.
45
 For the EU as a 
signatory and party to the Aarhus Convention
46
 and an actor that officially wants to „work 
towards strengthening international environmental governance‟47, this would have been an 
ideal opportunity to aim at the transfer of the related acquis rules to third countries.  
In fact, in the discussions on the EU negotiating mandate, several EU countries, in 
particular Belgium, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland, supported a „clear signal 
in favour of […] detailed provisions on public participation in decision-making on GMOs 
consistent with existing Community legislation‟. This opinion was, however, rejected by 
another group of member states, led by France. The latter explicitly favoured a non legally-
binding option or a rather general obligation to promote, i.e. not guarantee, public 
participation. A similar conservative stance was taken by the European Commission.
48
 Given 
the conservative position of important EU member states, such as France and Germany, and 
the diversity of views within the EU, the negotiations proved to be extremely difficult and 
polarized. A final compromise on legally binding rules for participation on GMO issues was 
reached at last minute at the second meeting of the Parties in Almaty in 2005. 
The reluctant EU position has been ascribed to two main factors. It was on the one 
hand seen as „service to the GMO industry and the governments that support it‟. On the other 
hand, observers pointed to pressure from the US government.
49
 One observer named a 
„coalition of the biotechnology and trade lobby‟ as the source of the EU‟s tough stance. What 
is at stake regarding the promotion of public participation rules in GMO issues? In the 
European Union, the field of GMO is characterized by rather strict regulation and a sceptical 
public opinion. The former has led large biotech companies to relocate research activities, 
field trials and commercialization outside the EU.
50
 In parallel with the growing scepticism of 
Western European public opinion on GMO in the 1990s, transnational corporations such as 
Monsanto and Pioneer began to focus on Central and Eastern Europe where public awareness 
regarding this issue was much lower. Since agriculture is still a major economic sector this 
region, it is attractive for the western agricultural industry to start with field trials as a first 
step towards subsequent commercialization. Furthermore, the levels of regulation were very 
weak, in particular when compared to those of the EU. Since most Central and Eastern 
European countries lacked well-developed laws on this issue, there were hardly any hurdles to 
companies‟ activities. Transparency on field trials was often rather low. Lack of public protest 
was even seen in to be a market advantage.
51
 This provided a rather favourable environment 
for biotechnology corporations since they usually have a preference for low regulation.
52
 
In the European Union, the big member states Germany, United Kingdom and France 
are leading players in biotechnology.
53
 The European Union itself is a target of lobbying 
activities of transnational bioindustry associations such as EuropaBio who enjoy „good 
working relations with the Commission‟54 and are reported to have an influence on decision 
making.
55
 In 2003, the Competitiveness in Biotechnology Advisory Group with Industry and 
Academia was appointed by the Commission. It comprises „representatives from all the 
various industry segments and from companies at every stage of company development 
together with entrepreneurial academics‟. Besides the good access, internal unity of the 
European biotech sector has strengthened considerably during the 1990s.
56
 Firstly, in 1997 the 
European association EuropaBio was founded. Secondly, companies tend to enter into large 
coalitions. Thirdly, there is a trend for mergers within the sector. The global biotechnology 
industry structure is characterized by high concentration and internationalization where 
regional differences of interests disappear. Such a high concentration is generally assumed to 
be conductive to successful lobbying against strict regulations.
57
 
With regard to the amendment of the Aarhus Convention, the world‟s largest 
biotechnology organization, the Biotechnology Industry Organization,  which enjoys strong 
(financial) support of major biotech firms, maintains close relationships with US regulatory 
agencies
58
 and has EuropaBio among its members expressed its discontent with new legally 
binding solutions.
59
 The same opinion was voiced by CropLife International.
60
 This global 
federation represents the plant science industry and also represents EuropaBio as one of its 
members. It was represented by two to three people in the negotiations who actively 
expressed „conservative‟ standpoints. European Environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), including NGOs from Eastern Europe, on the other hand have from the 
beginning called on EU environmental ministers to support the introduction of legally binding 
participation rules into the Convention
61
 and „not to continue moving down a path of 
promoting weak biosafety frameworks in the non-EU region‟.62 NGO representatives report 
that democratic governance issues related to GMO are in general weakly financed in EU and 
for NGOs it is difficult to receive funding. In Eastern Europe the situation is said to be even 
worse. Obviously, the coalition of environmental agents that has profited from and was 
carried by a strong negative public perception of agri-biotechnology and that „succeeded in 
stemming the demand for deregulation and induced a strengthening of European GMO 
policy‟63 has much less influence when it comes to external relations. This can be explained 
by the lack of „public outrage‟, i.e. the „fear or anger a particular risk generates among a 
relatively large part of a country‟s population‟64 and the resulting decline of collective action 
capacity. 
As a result of the case study an additional factor emerged as potentially important for 
the outcome. Besides the biotech companies‟ and their business associations‟ initiatives, it 
must be kept in mind that GMO issues are subject to „regulatory polarization‟ between the US 
and the EU with the US on the „pro-agri-biotech‟ side and the EU on the other.65 US 
initiatives massively back the industry‟s activities in Eastern Europe.66 Moreover, it needs to 
be kept in mind that in 2003, after years of threatening to do so, the government of the USA, 
responding to domestic interests, and other GMO exporters filed suit against the EU before 
the World Trade Organization on GMO crops and food.
67
 There was thus a severe 
transatlantic tension over this issue. While one of the Commission‟s answers to this crisis was 
to signal an end of the unofficial moratorium on GMO release, the conservative stance in the 
Aarhus amendment negotiations can also be interpreted as a strategy to appease the US 
government that was very much against the amendment. Eventually, the Commission‟s stance 
reflected very much the position of DG Trade. 
 
Water Governance 
 
With the adoption of the Water Framework Directive in 2000, the EU established a 
framework for water protection and management whose success is seen to be dependent „on 
information, consultation and involvement of the public‟.68 Article 14 of this directive is 
dedicated to public information and consultation and demands that „Member States shall 
encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the implementation of this 
Directive, in particular in the production, review and updating of the river basin management 
plans‟. More concretely, they shall ensure that „they publish and make available for comments 
to the public, including users‟ certain specified documents related to a new or updated river 
basin management plan, and „shall allow at least six months to comment in writing on those 
documents in order to allow active involvement and consultation‟. River basin management 
plans in turn have to include „a summary of the public information and consultation measures 
taken, their results and the changes to the plan made as a consequence‟.69 
In contrast to the issue of GMO, water governance in Eastern European ENP countries 
is not connected to comparably strong commercial interests that would be incompatible with 
the promotion of public participation. On the one hand, the water sector is an example that 
„challenged the notion that the civil society sector acts only as a counterpart to the private 
sector‟. In particular with regard to the issues of water pricing and full cost recovery 
environmental NGOs have joined the pro-pricing position of the water industry in the past.
70
 
Furthermore, the preferences of stakeholders from the industry regarding the regulation of 
water issues are not necessarily equal but may even be contradictory, e.g. between agriculture 
and private water companies.
71
 On the other hand, Eastern European ENP countries are rather 
unattractive for international private water operators. Investments are seen to be risky due to 
the economic and political situation, weak regulatory frameworks, comparatively poor 
revenue streams due to low tariffs that are usually below operational costs and do not meet 
requirements of full cost-recovery, and a lack of political will to involve the private sector. 
Thus, Public-Private Partnerships in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asian (EECCA) 
countries with international participation remain at a low level.
72
 
Public participation is one of the central themes of EU environmental cooperation with 
the Eastern neighbours and takes place in different frameworks. The EU does not hide its 
attempt to promote participative water governance in Eastern European ENP countries. On the 
contrary, the enhancement of public participation is regularly a component in water related 
projects. The 2007 Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Europe expects as results of 
the planned activities among others the „[e]nhanced implementation of the EU Water 
initiative‟ and „[i]ncreased environmental awareness and civil society cooperation‟.73 For 
example, the EU-financed project on „Environmental Collaboration for the Black Sea‟ (2007-
2009), which comprised Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, on the one hand aimed to improve 
national legislation taking into account the water-related EU acquis and on the other hand 
explicitly included the improvement of public participation as one project goal.  Adoption and 
implementation of water-related legislation is also the aim of another EU-financed project on 
„Water Governance in the Western EECCA Countries‟ (2008-2010), which involves Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The work on these countries‟ 
legislation is seen as „part of the process of convergence with EU environmental legislative 
and implementation principles‟. As such, the project also intends to support public 
participation in decision-making processes.
74
 Thus, with regard to water governance, we see a 
clear intention of the EU to promote its norms on public participation which translates into 
concrete action.  
 
Fisheries Policy 
 
Governance has recently become a major topic in the EU‟s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). 
Regarding participation in fisheries policy the basic Council Regulation for the reformed CFP, 
EC 2371/2002 now defines in Article 2.2 that fisheries policy „shall be guided by […] broad 
involvement of stakeholders at all stages of the policy […]‟. The topic of participatory 
governance was not only raised at a rhetorical level but concrete measures have been taken in 
order to substantiate it, in particular with the renewal of the Advisory Committee for Fisheries 
and Aquaculture (ACFA) in 1999 and the establishment of Regional Advisory Councils 
(RAC) in 2002. Furthermore, there exists a Sectoral Dialogue Committee on sea fisheries. 
The EU‟s CFP has developed an external dimension. Clearly, the fisheries agreements 
are its most important aspect.
75
 Their present design is the result of a reform process in the 
year 2002. This reform aimed at a new approach towards third countries. In contrast to the 
much criticized „pay, fish and go‟ approach of the existing fishing agreements, new 
partnership agreements were designed with a „focus on cooperation to promote sustainable 
fishing, just as in our own waters‟.76 With their inclusion of dialogue and the setting aside of a 
share of the EU‟s financial contribution in order to „to support the sectoral fisheries policy in 
the third country with a view to introducing responsible and sustainable fishing‟77 the 
agreements have a dual aim. Besides the commercial dimension there is the objective of 
„projecting the Community „acquis‟ in multilateral and bilateral arenas‟.78 
The new external dimension of the CFP has been implemented since 2003. Today, all 
fisheries agreements with financial compensation are FPAs and in all of them, a percentage of 
the EU‟s financial contribution is earmarked for fisheries sector support in the respective third 
country.  The third countries‟ progress with sector reforms is regularly discussed in Joint 
Committees on the basis of a country specific „sectoral matrix‟ (matrice sectorielle). An 
analysis of the available minutes of the Joint Committees
79
 shows that issues of participation 
do not play a role in these meetings. In no instance did the EU refer to or even demand the 
enhancement of stakeholder participation with regard to fisheries in the third country. This is 
also acknowledged by interview partners. The same picture emerges from the sectoral 
matrices that the author was able to obtain. This does not imply that single matrices do not 
refer to arrangements to extend stakeholder participation. For example the matrix of Guinea-
Bissau makes a reference to the strengthening of participative management committees 
(comités de gestion participative). However, as interview partners confirmed, there is no 
systematic attempt by the EU to encourage third countries to establish such arrangements. On 
the contrary, the EU explicitly rejects the promotion of governance norms through FPA: 
„Some of the expectations placed on FPAs are unreasonable: they are there to support and 
assist, but they are not a tool for imposing what we think are the „right‟ policies or governance 
systems on our partners. Their sovereignty is paramount.‟ 80 
At first sight this statement seems to point to conflicting norms, i.e. democratic 
governance promotion vs. non-interference into the affairs of a sovereign state. However, 
even though the EU might have some leverage in some of the FPA countries, there would be 
no possibility to „impose‟ governance reforms. Eventually, the third countries are free to 
spend the compensation from the FPAs as they want. Furthermore, given that the EU has an 
official democracy promotion policy in place which explicitly rejects the imposition of 
democracy from the outside
81
 and has democracy and human rights clauses in all its general 
agreements with third countries the reluctance to participatory governance promotion can 
rather be attributed to the opinion that it would make matters much more complicated as one 
interviewee judged. Fisheries agreements first and foremost remain commercial agreements. 
They are the result of negotiations on quota and financial compensation and there are diverse 
interests connected to them. The 2002 Commission Communication on FPAs states that apart 
from the overall aim of promoting sustainable fisheries, the specific objective of the CFP with 
regard to the Fisheries Agreements is „to maintain the European presence in distant Fisheries 
and to protect European fisheries sector interests‟.82 The Council endorsed this objective with 
a view to employment and those European regions that are highly dependent on fisheries.
83
 
The FPAs in their present form mainly serve the catching sector‟s interests. In 
particular the fleets from Spain, Portugal, Italy and France benefit from them. At EU level, 
these interests are represented by Europêche as the „vehicle through which the national 
fishermen‟s organizations agree their official representation vis-à-vis the Commission‟.84 In 
its position on the 2002 sector reform this group attached „utmost importance‟ to the CFP‟s 
external dimension and pointed to „the essentially commercial character‟ of fisheries 
agreements.
85
 In 2009, Europêche rejected any change of the CFP‟s external objectives and 
stated that the external dimension „must continue to target upholding Community fishing 
fleets‟ interests in third countries‟.86 The French Union of the Armateurs à la Pêche demanded 
in 1998 that the EU should pursue „an aggressive, dynamic and expansionist policy in the 
matter of fishing agreements. It no longer suffices to safeguard what already exists, [the EU] 
should develop what could be‟.87 The catching sector was the dominant pressure group in the 
early 2000s and still is rather influential. There are strong informal contacts between fisheries 
lobbyists and some national Council delegations. Partly, these circles have evolved through a 
common university education of its members and now persist. In general, the CFP is 
characterized as „rather strong horizontal coordinating governance arrangement […] between 
policymakers, fisheries managers and the fisheries sector‟ where the inner circle is made up of 
a limited number of actors, i.e. fishers and policymakers.
88
 Fishing interests have also long 
been organized at the national level and are viewed to be even more influential on CFP 
development than European organizations.
89
 They enjoy a high level of political salience that 
does not necessarily match statistical indicators.
90
 In contrast to the GMO case, external 
sectoral interests are not involved in the fisheries case. 
Calls on the EU to promote participatory governance come from European NGOs such 
as the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements, some members of the European Parliament, 
and – from the outside – third country fisheries organizations.91 They are often part of a more 
comprehensive development agenda for the third countries. However, these demands are not 
reflected in the EU‟s policy. This is not least due to the worse access points for these actors: 
„in an area of Commission competence, where DG Fisheries is in the lead [and DG 
Development marginalized], and where Council considerations are focused on fish rather than 
development, there is little formal opportunity for development inputs to be made‟.92 
Interestingly, however, the ACFA as the official consultative committee of the Commission 
on fisheries that includes representatives from industry but – since its reform in 1999 – also 
environmental and development NGOs has recently suggested that through the FPAs „the EU 
should promote transparency and stakeholder participation, two important aspects recognized 
by the code of conduct for responsible fishing of the FAO‟.93 It remains to be seen whether 
this position will finally be reflected in the future EU policy on cooperation under the FPAs. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The promotion of democratic governance through sectoral cooperation offers the EU a third, 
alternative way to further democratization objectives in third countries. In particular in 
contexts where top-down leverage and bottom-up linkage strategies reach their limits
94
 the 
governance approach with its focus on the transfer of functional solutions for policy problems 
opens a „back door‟ for democracy promotion. Whereas research has shown that the EU is 
able to induce the adoption of rules of democratic governance in third countries
95
 this article 
has demonstrated that it does not always make use of this potential. After investigating EU 
democratic governance promotion in three cases with different levels of adverse interests, it 
can be concluded that the governance model is subject to the same pattern of inconsistency as 
the linkage and leverage model.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In cases such as cooperation on water governance with Eastern European ENP countries 
where no significant interests of EU domestic actors or other important external actors are 
hurt by the promotion of rules of democratic governance the EU puts emphasis on them. The 
two cases of cooperation on GMO with Eastern European ENP countries and cooperation on 
fisheries policy under FPAs, however, showed that the EU does not only neglect democratic 
governance promotion when sectoral interests would be hurt but even actively rejects such 
demands. While in the GMO case there are also strong external sectoral interests that may 
have influenced the result, no such interests are present in the fisheries case. Thus, strong 
external sectoral interests do not seem to be decisive for the inconsistency of EU democratic 
governance promotion.
96
 Summing up, the EU‟s democratic governance promotion policy is 
likely to be inconsistent when significant adverse sectoral economic interests are at stake. 
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Table 1: EU participatory governance promotion 
 
 GMO – Eastern European 
ENP countries 
Water – Eastern European 
ENP countries 
Fisheries – FPA 
Acquis Issue specific, 
internationally embedded 
Issue specific, 
internationally embedded 
Issue specific, 
internationally embedded 
Interdependence Not unfavourable for EU Not unfavourable for EU Not unfavourable for EU 
Security Low politics Low politics Low politics 
Proximity Close Close Close/Distant 
Interests Agri-biotech industry (vs. 
Environmental NGOs) 
(external actors), Trade 
lobby 
No significant adverse 
interests 
Catching sector (vs. 
Development NGOs) 
Participatory governance 
promotion 
– + – 
 
